Boeing shareholders gave 44%-support to a shareholder proposal for the shareholder right to act by written in spite of Boeing management using scare tactics. Boeing management conjured up a defective form of written consent, that theoretically could be adopted by an out-of-control Board, and then focused its argument on such a defective form of written const that did not resemble the written consent proposal itself.

Although it now theoretically takes 25% of all shares to call for a special shareholder meeting, this translates into 45% of the Boeing shares that typically vote at the annual meeting. It would be hopeless to think that the shares that do not have time to vote at the annual meeting would have time to take the special procedural steps to call for a special shareholder meeting. A 45% stock ownership threshold to call for a special shareholder meeting is nothing for Boeing management to brag about.

This proposal is consistent with genuine Boeing management engagement with shareholders. A reasonable shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting can make shareholder engagement meaningful. Shareholder Engagement is cited many times in the 2021 Boeing annual meeting proxy statement. If management is insincere in its shareholder engagement, a right for shareholders to call for a special meeting can make management think twice about insincerity.