AMAZON.COM, INC. | Fair Director Elections at AMAZON.COM, INC.

11.53% votes in favour
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
Resolution details
Company ticker
Lead filer
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Company sector
Consumer Discretionary
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
James McRitchie and other shareholders request that directors of amend its bylaws to include the following language:
“Shareholder approval is required for any advance notice bylaw amendments that: require nomination of candidates more than 60 days before the annual meeting,impose new disclosure requirements for director nominees, including disclosures related to past and future plans, orrequire nominating shareholders to disclose limited partners or business associates, except to the extent such investors own more than 5% of’s shares.
Supporting statement
Supporting Statement
Under SEC Rule 14a-19, the universal proxy card must include all director nominees presented by management and shareholders for election.1 Although the Rule implies each side's nominees must be grouped together and clearly identified as such, in a fair and impartial manner, most rules for director elections are set in company bylaws.
For Rule 14a-19 to be implemented equitably, boards must not undertake bylaw amendments that deter legitimate efforts by shareholders to submit nominees. The bylaw amendments set forth in the proposed resolution would presumptively deter legitimate use of Rule 14a-19 by deterring legitimate efforts by shareholders to seek board representation through a proxy contest.
The power to amend bylaws is shared by directors and shareholders. Although directors have the power to adopt bylaw amendments, shareholders have the power to check that authority by repealing board-adopted bylaws. Directors should not amend the bylaws in ways that inequitably restrict shareholders’ right to nominate directors. This resolution simply asks the board to commit not to amend the bylaws to deter legitimate efforts to seek board representation, without submitting such amendments to shareholders. We urge the Board not to amend its advance notice bylaws until shareholders have at least voted on this proposal.
Directors of at least one company (Masimo Corp.) recently adopted bylaw amendments that could deter legitimate efforts by shareholders to seek board representation through a proxy contest. Masimo’s advance notice bylaws "resemble the 'nuclear option' and offers a case study in how rational governance devices can become unduly weaponized, writes Lawrence Cunningham.2 Directors of other companies are considering similar proposals.
Bloomberg’s Matt Levine speculates bylaws might require disclosure submissions “on paper woven from unicorns’ manes,”3 with requirements waived for the board’s nominees.
This request should be seen in context: Judith McGrath, Chair of Leadership Development and Compensation, won only 78% of the vote in 2022. The advisory vote on executive pay won 56%.
Shareholders also voiced board dissatisfaction by voting on 15 shareholder proposals, including reducing plastic use, reports on lobbying, assessing human rights due diligence, risks associated with use of Rekognition, and an audit of working conditions, which each received more than 40% of the vote.
To ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions, we urge a vote FOR Fair Elections.

How other organisations have declared their voting intentions

Organisation name Declared voting intentions Rationale
Kutxabank Gestion SGIIC SAU. For
Anima Sgr Against As the proposal language may result in a bylaw amendment that is both overly restrictive of the board's ability to amend the bylaws, and not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. Further, there does not appear to have been any problematic bylaw amendment unilaterally adopted by the board that would suggest a need to impose the restrictions sought by this proposal.
Rothschild & co Asset Management Against

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