BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION | Shareholder ratification of termination pay at BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION

Status
Deleted
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
7
Resolution details
Company ticker
BAC
Lead filer
Resolution ask
Other ask
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Remuneration or pay
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Financials
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders request that the Board seek shareholder approval of any senior manager’s new or renewed pay package that provides for severance
or termination payments with an estimated value exceeding 2.99 times the sum of the executive’s base salary plus target short-term bonus.
Supporting statement
“Severance or termination payments” include cash, equity or other pay that is paid out or vests due to a senior executive’s termination for any
reason. Payments include those provided under employment agreements, severance plans, and change-in-control clauses in long-term equity plans,
but not life insurance, pension benefits, or deferred pay earned and vested prior to termination.
“Estimated total value” includes: lump-sum payments; payments offsetting tax liabilities, perquisites or benefits not vested under a plan generally
available to management employees, post-employment consulting fees or office expense and equity awards if vesting is accelerated, or a
performance condition waived, due to termination.
The Board shall retain the option to seek shareholder approval after material terms are agreed upon.
Generous performance-based pay can sometimes be justified but shareholder ratification of “golden parachute” severance packages with a total
cost exceeding 2.99 times base salary plus target short-term bonus better aligns management pay with shareholder interests.
For instance at one company, that does not have this policy, if the CEO is terminated he could receive $44 million in termination pay—over 10
times his base salary plus short-term bonus. In the event of a change in control, the same person could receive a whopping $124 million in
accelerated equity payouts even if he remained employed.
It is in the best interest of Bank of America shareholders and the morale of Bank of America employees to be protected from such lavish
management termination pay for one person.
It is important to have this policy in place so that Bank of America management stays focused on improving company performance as opposed to
seeking a business combination simply to trigger a management golden parachute windfall.

How other organisations have declared their voting intentions

Organisation nameDeclared voting intentionsRationale
Anima SgrAgainstThe company has a policy that requires agreements providing for severance benefits exceeding two times the sum of base salary and bonus be submitted for shareholder approval. In addition, the company's policy includes the value of accelerated equity in certain instances. The company's policy does appear to meaningfully mitigate the risk of cash severance payments that are excessive or not in line with market norms. Further, the equity plan generally provides for double trigger treatment of equity awards, mitigating the potential for a windfall occurring due to a change in control without an accompanying termination. In light of the company's current policy and the absence of significant concerns noted with respect to the company's equity vesting provisions currently, we intend to vote against this proposal.
Kutxabank Gestion SGIIC SAU.Against
Rothschild & co Asset ManagementAgainst

DISCLAIMER: By including a shareholder resolution or management proposal in this database, neither the PRI nor the sponsor of the resolution or proposal is seeking authority to act as proxy for any shareholder; shareholders should vote their proxies in accordance with their own policies and requirements.

Any voting recommendations set forth in the descriptions of the resolutions and management proposals included in this database are made by the sponsors of those resolutions and proposals, and do not represent the views of the PRI.

Information on the shareholder resolutions, management proposals and votes in this database have been obtained from sources that are believed to be reliable, but the PRI does not represent that it is accurate, complete, or up-to-date, including information relating to resolutions and management proposals, other signatories’ vote pre-declarations (including voting rationales), or the current status of a resolution or proposal. You should consult companies’ proxy statements for complete information on all matters to be voted on at a meeting.