Bloomin' Brands Inc | Right to call special stockholder meeting at Bloomin' Brands Inc

Status
50.41% votes in favour
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
6
Resolution details
Company ticker
NASDAQ: BLMN
Lead filer
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Consumer Discretionary
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend the appropriate company governing documents to give the owners of a combined 10% of our outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting regardless of length of stock ownership.
Supporting statement
One of the main purposes of this proposal is to give shareholders the right to formally participate in calling for a special shareholder meeting regardless of their length of stock ownership to the fullest extent possible.

Some companies prohibit shareholders from participating in calling for a special shareholder if they own stock for less than one continuous year. Requiring one continuous year of stock ownership can serve as a poison pill. I know of no instance of shareholders ever having success in calling for a special shareholder meeting at a company that excludes all shares not held for a continuous full year. It is important to vote for this Shareholder Right to Call a Special Shareholder Meeting proposal because we have no right to act by written consent. Shareholders at many companies have a right to call a special shareholder and the right to act by written consent.

A reasonable shareholder right to call for a special shareholder meeting could give directors more of an incentive to improve their performance. For instance, John Mahoney, Chair of the BLMN Audit Committee, received up to 70-times the negative votes as other directors at our 2021 annual meeting. Mr. Mahoney has a free ride until 2024 when he next stands for re-election. Plus our excessive executive pay was rejected by 35% of shares in 2021 when a 5% rejection rate is the norm. This is a corporate governance improvement proposal like the 2021 BLMN shareholder proposal to eliminate our undemocratic 75%-voting thresholds that won our outstanding 92%-support and was adopted. It is also like the 2020 BLMN shareholder proposal for one-year terms for directors which received our 84% support and will be fully adopted in 2024. To make up for our lack of a right to act by written consent we need the right of 10% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting.

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