Walmart, Inc | Fair Director Elections at Walmart, Inc

Status
AGM passed
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
9
Resolution details
Company ticker
WMT
Lead filer
CorpGov.net
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Consumer Discretionary
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Resolved:
James McRitchie and other shareholders request that directors of Walmart Inc. (“Company”) amend its bylaws to include the following language:
Shareholder approval is required for any advance notice bylaw amendments that:
1. require the nomination of candidates more than 90 days before the annual meeting,
2. impose new disclosure requirements for director nominees, including disclosures related to past and future plans, or
3. require nominating shareholders to disclose limited partners or business associates, except to the extent such investors own more than 5% of the Company’s shares.
Supporting statement
Supporting Statement
Under SEC Rule 14a-19, the universal proxy card must include all director nominees presented by management and shareholders for election.[1] Although the Rule implies each side’s nominees must be grouped together and clearly identified as such, in a fair and impartial manner, most rules for director elections are set in company bylaws.
For Rule 14a-19 to be implemented equitably, boards must not undertake bylaw amendments that deter legitimate efforts by shareholders to submit nominees. The bylaw amendments set forth in the proposed resolution would presumptively deter legitimate use of Rule 14a-19 by deterring legitimate efforts by shareholders to seek board representation through a proxy contest.
The power to amend bylaws is shared by directors and shareholders. Although directors have the power to adopt bylaw amendments, shareholders have the power to check that authority by repealing board-adopted bylaws. Directors should not amend the bylaws in ways that inequitably restrict shareholders’ right to nominate directors. This resolution simply asks the board to commit not to amend the bylaws to deter legitimate efforts to seek board representation, without submitting such amendments to shareholders. We urge the Board not to further amend its advance notice bylaws until shareholders have at least voted on this proposal.
Bloomberg’s Matt Levine speculates bylaws might require disclosure submissions “on paper woven from unicorns’ manes,”[2] with requirements waived for the board’s nominees. While Mr. Levine depicts humorous and exaggerated possibilities, some companies are adopting amendments clearly designed to discourage fair elections.
Directors of at least one company (Masimo Corp.) recently adopted bylaw amendments that could deter legitimate efforts by shareholders to seek board representation through a proxy contest. Masimo’s advance notice bylaws “resemble the ‘nuclear option’ and offers a case study in how rational governance devices can become unduly weaponized, writes Lawrence Cunningham.[3] Directors of other companies are considering similar proposals.
To ensure shareholders can vote on any proposal that would impose inequitable restrictions, we urge a vote FOR Fair Elections.
To Enhance Shareholder Value, Vote FORFair Elections – Proposal [4*]

How other organisations have declared their voting intentions

Organisation name Declared voting intentions Rationale
Anima Sgr Against As the proposal language may result in a bylaw amendment that is both overly restrictive of the board's ability to amend the bylaws, and not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. The proposal could significantly limit the board's flexibility to respond to changing circumstances, laws, and regulations and thus may hinder the board's ability to require full and fair shareholder disclosure regarding director nominees and their potential conflicts of interest. Further, there does not appear to have been any problematic bylaw amendment unilaterally adopted by the board that would suggest that support for this proposal is warranted.
Rothschild & co Asset Management Against

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