Northrop Grumman Corporation | Reduce ownership threshold to call special meeting

Status
50.40% votes in favour
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
4
Resolution details
Company ticker
NOC
Lead filer
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Industrials
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders ask our board to take the steps necessary to amend the appropriate company governing documents to give the owners of a combined 10% of our outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareholder meeting.
Supporting statement
It is important for a reasonable 10% of shares to have the right to call for a special shareholder meeting to help make up for our totally useless right to act by written consent. It is worse to have no right at all than to find that the right that is technically on the Northrop Grumman books is totally useless. Southwest Airlines and Target are companies that do not provide for shareholder written consent and yet provide for 10% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting.
Why would any group of shareholders, who own 25% of our company, find it attractive to do so little as to ask management to look a calendar and come up with a record date for written consent when the owners of the 25% of our company can compel management to hold a special shareholder meeting?
To initiate written consent at NOC, 25% of shares now must petition management for the baby step of obtaining a record date.
Once a record date is obtained then shareholders are on a tight schedule to obtain the consent of 51% of shares outstanding which is equal to 60% of the shares that vote at the annual meeting. It would be hopeless to expect that shares that do not have time to vote would have the time to go through the special steps to act by written consent.
This turns into giving NOC shareholders a classic Catch-22 dilemma. In order to get a record date, 25% of shares must give their contact information to management. Thus it is easier than shooting fish in a barrel for NOC management, with free access to the corporate war chest and professional proxy solicitors, to pester the 25% of shares with messages and telephone calls to change their mind and revoke their support for acting by written consent.
Thus while the base of 25% of shares in favor of acting by written consent is easily venerable to management attack with deep pockets company money, these shareholders have the formidable task of doubling their number to 51% of shares (which equals 60% of the shares that vote at the annual meeting) in a limited time period with money out of their own pockets.
This is all the worse at NOC because NOC shareholders gave impressive 54% support for a real right to act by written consent and NOC management gave shareholders in return a useless right to act by written consent.
We need a right for 10% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting to help make up for our useless right to act by written consent.

DISCLAIMER: By including a shareholder resolution or management proposal in this database, neither the PRI nor the sponsor of the resolution or proposal is seeking authority to act as proxy for any shareholder; shareholders should vote their proxies in accordance with their own policies and requirements.

Any voting recommendations set forth in the descriptions of the resolutions and management proposals included in this database are made by the sponsors of those resolutions and proposals, and do not represent the views of the PRI.

Information on the shareholder resolutions, management proposals and votes in this database have been obtained from sources that are believed to be reliable, but the PRI does not represent that it is accurate, complete, or up-to-date, including information relating to resolutions and management proposals, other signatories’ vote pre-declarations (including voting rationales), or the current status of a resolution or proposal. You should consult companies’ proxy statements for complete information on all matters to be voted on at a meeting.