Although now it theoretically takes 25% of all shares to call for a special shareholder meeting, this translates into 33% of The Mosaic Company shares that typically vote at the annual meeting. It would be hopeless to think that the shares that do not have time to vote at the annual meeting would have the time to take the special procedural steps to call for a special shareholder meeting.
Then all shares that are owed but not owned long are excluded. Thus the shareholders who own 33% of the shares that vote at the annual meeting could find that they own 38% of the shares that vote at the annual meeting when their shares not owned long are included.
A realistic 38% stock ownership requirement to call a special shareholder meeting is a strong deterrent against shareholders ever taking the first small step to call for a special shareholder meeting. Any potential calling for a special shareholder can thus be killed in the crib by excluding all shares not owned long and realistically factoring out shares that do not vote.
Special shareholder meetings are hardly ever called by shareholders but the main point of the right to call a special shareholder meeting is that it gives shareholders at least significant standing to engage effectively with management.
Management will have an incentive to genuinely engage with shareholders if shareholders have a realistic option of calling for a special shareholder meeting. Management likes to claim that shareholders have multiple means to communicate with management but in most cases these are low impact means that are as effective as mailing a post card to the CEO. A more effective means to call for a special shareholder meeting is the key to effective shareholder engagement with management.