Resolved clauseRESOLVED: Amazon shareholders request that the Board report publicly on its framework for identifying and addressing misalignment between Amazon’s lobbying and policy influence activities and positions, and its Net Zero (emissions) climate commitments (done at reasonable cost, omitting confidential or proprietary information). This report should cover activities done both directly and indirectly through trade associations, coalitions, alliances, and social welfare organizations (“Associations”), and reference the criteria used to assess alignment, the escalation strategies employed to address misalignment, and the circumstances under which escalation strategies are used (e.g., timeline, sequencing, and degree of influence over an Association).
1 https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/doc downloads/2021/political engagement/2021-Political- Engagement-Statement.pdf ;https://lobbymap.org/influencer/California-Chamber-of-Commerce- 5bd0824487d9cdacdc577e0af93089ed
2 https://www.aei.org/articles/what-we-really-know-about-climate-change
3 https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/doc downloads/2022/Note-on-Alignment-with-Paris-Agreement.pdf
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/doc_downloads/2022/Note-on-Alignment-with-Paris-Agreement.pdf
7 Ibid.
8 https://climateactiontracker.org/global/cat-emissions-gaps
9 https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/press-release/nations-must-go-further-current-paris-pledges-or-face- global-warming ; https://www.unep.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2023
Whereas clauseWHEREAS: Plastic, with a lifecycle social cost at least ten times its market price, threatens the world’s oceans, wildlife, and public health.1Concern about the growing scale and impact of global plastic pollution has elevated the issue to crisis levels.2 Of particular concern are single-use plastics (SUPs),3 which make up the largest component of the 24-34 million metric tons of plastic ending up in waterways annually.
Cigarette filters are a form of single-use plastics. They are the most littered item globally with 4.5 trillion discarded annually, comprising 300,000 tons of potential plastic microfibers released into the environment. Cigarette filters do not biodegrade and can remain in the environment indefinitely in the form of microplastics. Discarded cigarette filters can contain more than 15,000 plastic microfibers and thousands of toxic chemicals.When cigarette filters are littered on streets and beaches, they can leach harmful pollutants into soil and water, including heavy metals and nicotine, which are toxic to fish and other sea creatures4
Annual costs of cleaning up littered filters are significant: $2.6 billion for China and $766 million for India.5 Cleanup costs have traditionally been borne by taxpayers rather than the industry placing these problematic products on the market. As a producer of plastic waste, Altria must begin to take financial responsibility for the cleanup of its cigarette filter/butt waste. The European Union’s Single-Use Plastics Directive imposes Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)on tobacco producers to cover the costs of collecting and processing cigarette filters, and Denmark, France, and Spain have already imposed cleanup fees.6
More than 100 companies support EPR laws requiring them to finance the collection of waste packaging to keep plastics from becoming uncontrolled waste.7Altria has stated its“products have an impact on the environment, and we have a responsibility to minimize that impact.”U.S.EPR tobacco laws to cover the costs of collecting and treating butt filters would help address the problem and create a level playing field for manufacturers. In the interim, Altria can voluntarily contribute significant funding to U.S. state or municipal governments to help finance existing filter collection and cleanup efforts.
BE IT
Supporting statementSUPPORTING STATEMENT:
In our company’s multi-class voting structure, Class B stock has 10 times the voting rights of Class A. As a result, Mr. Page and Mr. Brin currently control over 51% of our company’s total voting power while owning less than 12% of stock – and will continue to retain voting control even though they have stepped down from leading the company.
Due to this voting structure, our company takes public shareholder money but refuses shareholders an equal voice in the company’s management. For example, it was primarily the weight of the insiders’ 10 votes per share that permitted the creation of a non-voting class of stock (class C) even though most shareholders voted to oppose the move.
In another example, shareholders note that directly-employed Google workers are partially compensated in Class C stock. Google’s compensation philosophy states that “Googlers should share the success of the company,” but without voting rights, these employee-shareholders cannot exercise oversight of executives and find themselves subject to repeated layoffs, outsourcing, and interference with their freedom of association. Moreover, Google hires tens of thousands of contracted workers who have even less say over their indirect employer’s actions. This lack of worker voice can only depress employee performance and innovation.
A variety of corporate governance experts illustrate a growing concern about multi-class share structures:
· The Council for Institutional Investors (CII) recommends a seven-year phase-out of dual class share offerings. The International Corporate Governance Network supports CII’s recommendation “to require to a time-based sunset clause for dual class shares to revert to a traditional one-share/one-vote structure no more than seven years after a company’s IPO date.”
· The International Corporate Governance Network supports CII’s recommendation “to require to a time-based sunset clause for dual class shares to revert to a traditional one-share/one-vote structure no more than seven years after a company’s IPO date.”
· The Investor Stewardship Group recommends that “shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest” and “boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure.”
· As of October 1, 2023, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which rates companies on governance risk, gave our company a 10, its highest risk category, for the Governance QualityScore.
Shareholders are encouraged to vote FOR this good governance request to allow better shareholder oversight.