SUPPORTING STATEMENT: Nearly half of the organizations we follow closely by attending their annual meetings have recorded strong abstention votes on the appointment of their external auditors. These votes are not just with respect to one specific public accounting firm, but with respect to several of them, suggesting that shareholders are looking for a fresh perspective on the reliability of the financial information they receive, and on the independence of public accounting firms. The aim of auditor rotation is to reduce the obstacles to auditor independence, attributable largely to the familiarity that develops over time. There is a risk that, in the long term, the auditor may become too close to the client. For example, the auditor’s independence may be diminished when friendships develop: the auditor becomes too closely aligned with the interests of the client’s management, the audit plan becomes repetitive, or the auditor is reluctant to make decisions that would suggest that his or her previous decisions were erroneous. In short, the risk of an auditor becoming too familiar with the client is likely to undermine the auditor’s thoroughness, objectivity and critical thinking. Does the percentage of abstentions on the matter of the appointment of the current auditor reflect this opinion? We believe that such a service should be subject to change on a more frequent basis in order to assure shareholders that their auditors are offering them the best service possible at a competitive price, while ensuring a new approach to auditing by a different firm.