SUPPORTING STATEMENT: Almost half of the organizations we follow closely by attending their annual general meetings have experienced high abstention votes in relation to the appointment
of their external auditors. These votes are expressed not just with regards to one accounting firm, but a few, suggesting that shareholders are looking for fresh
insight into the reliability of the financial information they receive, and to the independence of the auditors.
The aim of rotating auditors is to reduce threats to their independence which are largely due to the familiarity that develops over time. There is reason to fear that,
in the long term, the auditor may become too close to its client. As an example, the auditor's independence can be diminished when friendships develop: the
auditor becomes too closely associated with the interests of the company’s management, the audit plan becomes repetitive, or the auditor is reluctant to make
decisions that would suggest that his or her previous decisions were wrong.
In short, the risks of familiarity with the client are likely to undermine the auditor's rigour, objectivity and critical thinking. Does the percentage of abstentions on the
appointment of the current auditor reflect this opinion? We believe that such a service should be subject to more frequent renewal of vision,