Nearly half of the organizations we closely follow by attending their annual meetings have experienced high abstention votes regarding the nomination of their external auditors. These votes are not only expressed in relation to one accounting firm, but several, suggesting that shareholders wish to gain a new perspective on the reliability of the financial information provided to them and the independence of the accountants. The aim of rotating auditors is to reduce threats to their independence, largely caused by the familiarity that gradually develops over time. It is feared that in the long term, the auditor may become too close to the client. For example, the independence of the auditor can decrease when friendships arise: the auditor associates too closely with the interests of the client company’s executives, the audit plan becomes repetitive, or the auditor hesitates to make decisions that would suggest that his previous decisions were erroneous. In short, risks of familiarity with the client are likely to harm the rigour, objectivity, and professional scepticism of the auditor. Does the percentage of abstentions regarding the nomination of the current auditor reflect this opinion? We believe that such a service should be subject to a vision renewal at a higher frequency to assure shareholders that their auditors offer them the best service at a competitive price while ensuring a new approach to auditing by a different firm.