RESOLVED: Shareholders request that our Board take all practicable steps in its control to initiate and adopt a recapitalization plan for all outstanding stock to have one vote per share. We recommend that this be done through a phase-out process in which the board would, within seven years or other timeframe justified by the board, establish fair and appropriate mechanisms through which disproportionate rights of Class B shareholders could be eliminated. This is not intended to unnecessarily limit our Board's judgment in crafting the requested change in accordance with applicable laws and existing contracts. SUPPORTING STATEMENT: In our company?s multi-class voting structure, Class B stock has 10 times the voting rights of Class A. As a result, Mr. Page and Mr. Brin currently control over 51% of our company?s total voting power while owning less than 13% of stock ? and will continue to retain voting control even though they have stepped down from leading the company. Due to this voting structure, our company takes public shareholder money but refuses shareholders an equal voice in the company?s management. For example, it was primarily the weight of the insiders? 10 votes per share that permitted the creation of a non-voting class of stock (class C) even though most shareholders voted to oppose the move. In another example, shareholders note that directly-employed Google workers are partially compensated in Class C stock. Google?s compensation philosophy states that ?Googlers should share the success of the company,? but without voting rights, these employee-shareholders cannot exercise oversight of executives and find themselves subject to repeated layoffs, outsourcing, and interference with their freedom of association. Moreover, Google hires tens of thousands of contracted workers who have even less say over their indirect employer?s actions, including this year's elimination of a 2019 policy that required U.S contractors and suppliers pay $15 an hour and provide health benefits to employees. This lack of worker voice can only depress employee performance and innovation. A variety of corporate governance experts illustrate a growing concern about multi-class share structures: The Council for Institutional Investors (CII) recommends a seven-year phase-out of dual class share offerings. The International Corporate Governance Network supports CII?s recommendation ?to require to a time-based sunset clause for dual class shares to revert to a traditional one-share/one-vote structure no more than seven years after a company?s IPO date.? Asset manager BlackRock reiterates that ?effective voting rights are basic rights of share ownership.? The Investor Stewardship Group recommends that ?shareholders should be entitled to voting rights in proportion to their economic interest? and ?boards should have a strong, independent leadership structure.? As of November 15, 2024, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), which rates companies on governance risk, gave our company a 10, its highest risk category, for the Governance QualityScore. Shareholders are encouraged to vote FOR this good governance request to allow better shareholder oversight.