PulteGroup Inc | Amendment to clawback policy on unearned incentive pay at PulteGroup Inc

Status
AGM passed
AGM date
Proposal number
4
Resolution details
Company ticker
PHM:US
Lead filer
Individual
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Materials
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders ask the Board of Directors to amend the Company Policy on recoupment of incentive pay to apply to the each Named Executive Officer and to state that conduct or negligence - not merely misconduct - shall trigger mandatory application of that policy. Also the Board shall report to shareholders in each annual meeting proxy the results of any deliberations regarding the policy, including the Board's reasons for not applying the policy after specific deliberations conclude, about whether or not to cancel or seek recoupment of unearned compensation paid, granted or awarded to NEOs under this policy. This improved clawback policy shall at least be included in the Governess Guidelines of the Company or similar document and be easily accessible on the Company website. The current Clawback Policy is clearly incomplete and can be difficult for shareholders to access. Wells Fargo offers a prime example of why PulteGroup needs a stronger policy. After 2016 Congressional hearings, Wells Fargo agreed to pay $185 million to resolve claims of fraudulent sales practices. The Wells Fargo Board then moved to claw back $136 million from 2 top executives. Wells Fargo unfortunately concluded that the CEO had only turned a blind eye to the practice of opening fraudulent accounts and thus failed to attempt any clawback and left $136 million on the table. At minimum this proposal alerts PHM shareholders that PHM executives can now be richly rewarded when they are negligent. This is the wrong incentive for PHM executives at a time when the best incentives for PHM executives should be supported.

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