W. R. BERKLEY CORPORATION | Director election resignation governance policy at W. R. BERKLEY CORPORATION

Status
9.80% votes in favour
AGM date
Resolution details
Company ticker
WRB
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Financials
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
The shareholders of W.R. Berkley Corporation (“Company”) request that the Board adopt a new Director Election Resignation Governance Policy (“Resignation Policy”) provision in its corporate governance principles to address those situations when one or more incumbent Board nominees fail to receive the required majority vote for re-election. The Resignation Policy shall provide that each director upon joining the Board tender an irrevocable resignation conditioned on the director’s failure to receive the required majority vote support in an uncontested election. The Resignation Policy shall provide that the Board should accept a director’s tendered resignation absent its finding of a compelling reason or reasons to reject the resignation, as decided by the Board in the exercise of its business judgment. The Resignation Policy shall further stipulate that if the Board rejects a director’s resignation and the director remains on the Board as a “holdover” director but is not re-elected at the next annual meeting of shareholders, that such director’s second tendered resignation shall be effective ninety days after the vote certification.
Supporting statement
The Resignation Policy sets a new demanding director resignation governance guideline to reflect shareholder voting sentiment in director elections. Delaware corporate law states that each director shall hold office until such director’s successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or removal. An incumbent director who does not receive the required vote for election may continue to serve as a “holdover” director. The Company’s current director resignation guideline requires incumbent directors to tender a resignation if they do not receive the requisite vote to be re-elected in an uncontested annual election. Directors on the Board’s Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee will then review the tendered resignation and recommend to the Board whether to accept or reject it.

The proposed Resignation Guideline Policy sets a more demanding director resignation review process, requiring the Board to articulate a compelling reason or reasons when it rejects a tendered resignation, thus allowing an unelected director to continue to serve. Importantly, the Resignation Policy further establishes that if a “holdover” director again fails to be re-elected at the next annual meeting of shareholders, the new resignation is effective ninety days following the election vote certification. While the Guideline Resignation Policy provides the Board latitude to reject the first resignation of an incumbent director who does not receive majority vote support, it honors the shareholder vote as the final word on a “holdover” director’s second election defeat.

Shareholder director election voting rights under Delaware corporate law are foundational rights in the governance of corporations. The majority vote director election standard adopted by the Company gives shareholders voting rights that have legal effect. It is important that corporate director resignation policies, guidelines and bylaws not undermine shareholder voting rights. The proposed Resignation Policy establishes shareholder voting in director elections as a more consequential governance right, striking a proper balance between board discretion and shareholder voting rights.

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