STARBUCKS CORPORATION | Requesting adoption of an independent board chair policy at STARBUCKS CORPORATION

Status
Filed
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
5
Resolution details
Company ticker
SBUX
Lead filer
National Legal and Policy Center
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Independent board
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Consumer Discretionary
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders request the Board of Directors of Starbucks Corporation (“Company”) adopt as policy, and amend the governing documents as necessary, to require hereafter that two separate people hold the office of the Chairman of the Board (“Chair”) and the office of the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) as follows:

Selection of the Chairman of the Board: The Board requires the separation of the offices of the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer.

Whenever possible, the Chairman of the Board shall be an Independent Director.

The Board may select a Temporary Chairman of the Board who is not an Independent Director to serve while the Board seeks an Independent Chairman of the Board.

The Chairman should not be a former CEO of the company.

Selection of the Chairman of the Board shall be consistent with applicable law and existing contracts.
Supporting statement
The Chair and CEO roles—each with separate, different responsibilities that are critical to the health of a successful corporation—are greatly diminished when held by a singular company official, weakening its governance structure.

Expert perspectives substantiate our position:

• According to the 2024 Spencer Stuart Board Index survey, 60 percent of S&P 500 companies had separate CEOs and Board Chairs as of 2024, up from 47 percent in 2014. Meanwhile, 39% of companies had an independent chair as of 2024, up from 28% in 2014.(1)

• Proxy adviser Institutional Shareholder Services contends that “the chair of the board should ideally be an independent director,” and generally encourages investors to vote for “shareholder proposals requiring that the board chair position be filled by an independent director.”(2)

• Proxy adviser Glass Lewis wrote in 2024, “it can become difficult for a board to fulfill its role of overseer and policy setter when a CEO/chair controls the agenda and the boardroom discussion. Such control can allow a CEO to have an entrenched position, leading to longer-than-optimal terms, fewer checks on management, less scrutiny of the business operation, and limitations on independent, shareholder-focused goal-setting by the board.”(3)

• According to the CFA Institute Research and Policy Center, “Combining [Chairman and CEO] positions may give undue influence to executive board members and impair the ability and willingness of board members to exercise their independent judgment … Many jurisdictions consider the separation of the chair and CEO positions a best practice because it ensures that the board agenda is set by an independent voice uninfluenced by the CEO.”(4)

Search firm Calibre One argues that “governance best practices increasingly recommend separating the roles of CEO from the Chair of the Board, especially in times of leadership transition or strategic inflection ... When one executive holds both titles, it can lead to ambiguity in oversight responsibilities. By contrast, separating the roles introduces a clearer distinction.”(5)

(1) https://www.spencerstuart.com/-/media/2024/09/ssbi2024/2024_us_spencer_stuart_board_index.pdf

(2) https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/active/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf

(3) https://resources.glasslewis.com/hubfs/2024%20Guidelines/2024%20US%20Benchmark%20Policy%20Guidelines.pdf

(4) https://rpc.cfainstitute.org/sites/default/files/-/media/documents/article/position-paper/corporate-governance-of-listed-companies-3rd-edition.pdf

(5) https://www.calibreone.com/a-thoughtful-look-at-ceo-chair-separation-what-boards-should-consider-in-2025/

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