DEAR FELLOW SHAREHOLDERS: As the Council of Institutional Investors’ Policies on Corporate Governance say, “Authorized, unissued preferred shares that have voting rights to be set by the board should not be issued without shareowner approval.” Yet Bloomin’s governing documents include “blank-check” preferred stock provisions—meaning a class of stock that a board of directors may issue, having voting and other rights determined solely by the Board (i.e., without shareholder approval). Weighing in on this topic, Glass Lewis says, “granting such broad discretion should be of concern to common shareholders,” since blank check preferred stock can be used in ways “that adversely affects the voting power or financial interests of common shareholders.” Indeed, blank-check preferred stock carries significant governance risks. Because blank-check preferred stock can be issued with disproportionate voting rights, conversion features, or other terms, it can be used as an anti-takeover defense or to dilute the voting power of common shareholders—without their consent. For instance, in proposing to remove its blank-check authority, Apple’s Board acknowledged that it can enable a board “to frustrate a merger or acquisition transaction that could be viewed favorably by shareholders” and can be “misused.” Shareholders overwhelmingly agreed, and that proposal passed with over 99% of the vote. Further, even the existence of blank-check provisions to impede takeover opportunities can entrench a board and management, thereby weakening accountability to shareholders. Consider, for example, that BlackRock says it frequently opposes company proposals requesting authorization of a class of blank-check preferred stock “because they may serve as a transfer of authority from shareholders to the board and as a possible entrenchment device.” And Vanguard Group says that its funds generally vote for proposals to create, amend, or issue common or preferred stock, unless the rights “include a blank-check provision” without anti-takeover restrictions. To be clear, this proposal’s adoption wouldn’t prevent the Board from raising capital or other ordinary business uses of preferred stock, but would simply require shareholder approval before it can be used for matters involving corporate control, which could weaken Board accountability and shareholder rights. This proposal requests a modest, common-sense safeguard that: (1) promotes transparency, because shareholders would have full information before a potentially dilutive or control-shifting issuance; (2) enhances accountability, because the Board would remain answerable to the owners of the company on fundamental capital structure changes; and (3) bolsters shareholder rights by strengthening investors’ ability to protect their economic and voting interests. Thank you.