TD SYNNEX Corporation | Director Vote (Kenneth Lamneck) at TD SYNNEX Corporation

Status
99.30% votes in favour
AGM date
Resolution details
Company ticker
SNX
Submitted by
John Chevedden
Resolution ask
Amend board structure
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Shareholder rights
Type of vote
Director vote
Filer type
Management
Company HQ country
United States
Supporting materials
  • Vote-No-Against-The-Chairman-of-the-TD-SYNNEX-Corporation-SNX-Governance-Committee-Kenneth-Lamneck.pdf Download
Supporting statement
Mr. Lamneck is ultimately responsible for the SNX bait and switch game on its own shareholders per this message to the Securities and Exchange Commission: Ladies and Gentlemen, Is it possible to have an exception to the ban on Exempt Solicitations on EDGAR by other than the very wealthy in a situation like this. There is a need for SNX shareholders to be aware on EDGAR of this SNX deception and for SNX shareholders to know that they have a recourse in voting against the Chair of the SNX Governance Committee. John Chevedden Proxy deception by TD SYNNEX Corporation (SNX) Ladies and Gentlemen, This is to report deception by TD SYNNEX Corporation (SNX) in conjunction with the 2025 SNX proxy and the 2026 SNX proxy. SNX sought to decrease the number of shares voting for the 2025 rule 14a-8 proposal for 10% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting by offering SNX shareholders the opportunity to vote on a competing non-binding SNX proposal for 25% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting. The 2025 SNX proxy made no mention of excluding all shares not held for a full year from formal participation in making up the 25% of all shares outstanding. As a result the rule 14a-8 proposal received 34% support and the SNX proposal received majority support. Then in response to the majority vote SNX put a binding proposal in its recently submitted 2026 proxy for 25% of shares to call for a special shareholder meeting and then added the spoiler that all shares not held for a full year could not formally participate. SNX shareholders were thus tricked into voting for a better 25% right to call for a special shareholder meeting in 2025 and were then faced with voting for a worse 25% right to call for a special shareholder meeting in 2026. If SNX was up front with its one-year spoiler in its 2025 proposal the rule 14a-8 proposal would likely have received more support and the SNX proposal would likely have received less support. John Chevedden

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