Equinor ASA | Disclose a strategy for creating shareholder value under scenarios of declining demand for oil and gas at Equinor ASA

Status
Filed
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
8
Resolution details
Company ticker
EQNR (previously Statoil)
Lead filer
Resolution ask
Report on or disclose
ESG theme
  • Environment
ESG sub-theme
  • Net zero / GHG emissions
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Energy
Company HQ country
Norway
Resolved clause
Shareholders request that Equinor(‘the Company’) publish a report disclosing the Company’s strategy for creating shareholder value under scenarios of declining demand for oil and gas, including the International Energy Agency Stated Policies Scenario and Announced Pledges Scenario. For each scenario, the report should include at least the following elements: • Capital expenditure on greenfield and brownfield for oil, gas, and other energy sources • Production and sales for oil, gas, and other energy sources • Free cash flow projections The report should cover at least the next ten years and may omit information that is commercially sensitive.
Supporting statement
Summary Multiple outlooks project impending decline in oil and gas demand. Equinor’s strategy remains exposed to material reliance on oil and gas markets. In the last major demand contraction, oil and gas companies across the sector experienced severe cash flow compression and impaired shareholder distributions. This resolution asks Equinor to clarify how it would create shareholder value under credible scenarios of declining oil and gas demand. With this transparency, investors can better judge how Equinor’s portfolio might perform under all circumstances. Declining demand Many trusted analysts increasingly predict that the world may soon enter a structural decline in oil and gas demand. STEPS and APS constitute credible scenarios, as they correspond to identifiable policies and market developments. STEPS represents the energy sector’s current direction of travel, based on the latest market data, technology costs, and in-depth analysis of the prevailing policy settings globally. APS anticipates the implementation of additional policies pledged by governments. These scenarios warrant investor concern, as they reflect ongoing and planned implementation of regulation, political support, and technological uptake, as well as market and economic realities Both see an impending peak in demand for oil and gas. In STEPS, oil demand peaks by 2030 and gas by 2035. In APS, both peak before 2030 and fall 17% by 2035 compared to 2023 (99–82 mb/d; 4186–3493 bcm). 1 The IEA’s June 2025 oil forecast predicts reduced demand by the end of the decade; this is noteworthy as it seems to align with the oil demand projections indicated in both STEPS and APS. 2 Regarding gas, the IEA states: “The period of LNG surplus in the STEPS makes it difficult for some exporters to fully recover their long-run marginal cost of supply, creating risks that project sponsors write off the value of the assets.”3 Other analysts also show outlooks divergent from Equinor’s. Rystad’s analysis shows oil peaking in the early 2030s, with gas plateauing soon after.1 This convergent view on a potential decline by a broad array of market analysts warrants serious concern from investors. Equinor’s strategy is based on continued demand for oil and gas Equinor continues to invest in upstream oil and gas developments and has positioned natural gas as a core component of its strategy, including as a supplier of energy security to Europe. While Equinor has expanded investments in renewables and low-carbon solutions, its future cash generation remains highly dependent on the production and sale of oil and gas over the coming decades. Equinor’s reporting shows internal stress-testing and scenario analysis, but it does not disclose scenario-specific impacts on capital expenditure allocation, production mix, and free cash flow under declining demand outcomes. As with peers, stress testing disclosure often emphasizes price sensitivity, while leaving other key factors such as demand, competitive market share dynamics, and portfolio repricing effects largely undisclosed. By not disclosing how the Company would adjust its capital allocation and production plans under credible declining-demand scenarios, Equinor leaves investors uncertain about its ability to create shareholder value. Historical precedent across multiple industries suggests that prolonged demand contraction puts downward pressure on prices. Further, most oil majors plan to raise production, creating oversupply. Revenue could be affected; only the most cost competitive producers would deliver value to shareholders in a declining market. Equinor does not disclose capital spending, production mix, or dividends if demand falls. Even maintaining production levels would require sustained competitiveness and market share resilience relative to peers in a shrinking market. Ongoing shareholder trust depends on answers to these questions. In 2020, with oil demand down 9% and prices at an average of $42 per barrel, the Company cut its dividends by 67%. A sustained decline portends much higher risks for Equinor and its shareholders. Conclusion Equinor’s current upstream investment exposure risks diverging from IEA APS and STEPS scenarios and other analyst project ions that foresee sustained demand decline. Failing to plan for these potentialities risks significant shareholder value loss due to impaired assets, lower margins, and reduced dividends. Transparent disclosure of how Equinor would adjust capital allocation, energy mix, and cash flow under declining oil and gas demand is essential to assess its business resilience. This resolution aims to ensure that Equinor’s strategy accounts for a complex and uncertain energy transition and demonstrates its ability to create shareholder value under a range of plausible scenarios. You have our support. 1 2 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2024 and World Energy Outlook 2025, tables A.9 and A.13 IEA, Oil 2025 3IEA, World Energy Outlook 2025 1Rystad, Global Energy Scenarios 2025

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