3M Company | Worker Pay in Executive Compensation at 3M Company

Status
10.96% votes in favour
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
5
Resolution details
Company ticker
MMM
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • Remuneration or pay
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Industrials
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders of 3M Corporation (the "Company'') request that the Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors take into consideration the pay grades and/or salary ranges of all classifications of Company employees when setting target amounts for CEO compensation. The Compensation Committee should describe in the Company's proxy statements for annual shareholder meetings how it complies with this requested policy. Compliance with this policy is excused if it will result in the violation of any existing contractual obligation or the terms of any existing compensation plan.
Supporting statement
Like at many companies, our Company's Compensation Committee uses peer group benchmarks of what other companies pay their CEOs to set its target CEO compensation. These target pay amounts are then subject to performance adjustments. To ensure that our Company's CEO compensation is reasonable relative to our Company's overall employee pay philosophy and structure, we believe that the Compensation Committee should also consider the pay grades and/or salary ranges of Company employees when setting CEO compensation target amounts.

This proposal does not require the Compensation Committee to use other employee pay data in a specific way to set CEO compensation targets. Under this proposal, the Compensation Committee will have discretion to determine how other employee pay should impact CEO compensation targets. The Compensation Committee also will retain authority to use peer group benchmarks and/or any other metric to set CEO compensation target amounts.

Over time, using peer group benchmarks to set CEO compensation can lead to pay inflation. Although many companies target CEO compensation at the median of their peer group, certain companies have targeted their CEO's pay above median. In addition, peer groups can be cherry-picked to include larger or more successful companies where CEO compensation is higher. (Charles Elson and Craig Ferrere, "Executive Superstars, Peer Groups and Overcompensation, "Journal of Corporation Law, Spring 2013).

The current system of using peer group benchmarks, without taking into account the pay grades or salary ranges of all company employees, when determining CEO compensation has had the effect of CEO pay far outpacing that of average employees. In 2019, the average S&P 500 CEO made 264 times that of their median employee. For our Company, the CEO/median employee ratio calculated in 2019 was 319 to 1. According to the 2006 report The State of Working America the ratio of CEO pay to average worker pay has risen from 35 to 1 in 1979, to 71 to 1 in 1989, to 248 to 1 in 1998. The current system of determining CEO compensation without taking into account the pay of average company employees has led to glaring inequality between the workers who make our company what it is and the person who sits at the top.

For those reasons, we urge you to vote in favor of this proposal.

How other organisations have declared their voting intentions

Organisation name Declared voting intentions Rationale
Boston Trust Walden Against
Universities Superannuation Scheme - USS Against After careful consideration, we do not believe the proponent's resolution is in the best interests of shareholders

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