CHEVRON CORPORATION | Separate chair/CEO at CHEVRON CORPORATION

Status
29.50% votes in favour
AGM date
Previous AGM date
Proposal number
8
Resolution details
Company ticker
CVX
Resolution ask
Adopt or amend a policy
ESG theme
  • Governance
ESG sub-theme
  • CEO / chair duality
Type of vote
Shareholder proposal
Filer type
Shareholder
Company sector
Energy
Company HQ country
United States
Resolved clause
Shareholders request the Board of Directors to adopt as policy, and amend the bylaws as necessary, to require that whenever possible the Chair of the Board of Directors be an independent member of the Board. This policy would phase in for the next CEO transition.

If the Board determines that a Chair who was independent when selected is no longer independent, within a reasonable period it shall select a new Chair who satisfies the requirements of this policy. Compliance with this policy can be waived if no independent director is available and willing to serve as Chair.
Supporting statement
We believe that inadequate board oversight has led to management mishandling of a number of issues, which has increased both risk and cost to stockholders.

For example, Chevron mishandled risk related to an ongoing legal effort by communities in Ecuador to enforce a USD9.5 billion judgment for oil pollution. When Chevron acquired Texaco in 2001, it inherited significant legal, financial, and reputational liabilities that stemmed from pollution of the water and lands of communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon. In 2018, Ecuador's Constitutional Court unanimously confirmed a USD9.5 billion judgment against Chevron.

Chevron has acknowledged the serious risk from enforcement of the USD9.5 billion judgment. Deputy Controller Rex Mitchell testified, under oath, that such seizures of Company assets "would cause significant, irreparable damage to Chevron's business reputation and business relationships." However, instead of negotiating a swift, reasonable, and comprehensive settlement with the affected Ecuadorian communities, management has pursued a costly and protracted legal strategy that has lasted more than two decades.

As well, investors are concerned that Chevron has not adequately addressed climate change - a massive risk that is already manifest and set to intensify over time via regulation, energy price swings, and growing uncertainty around the value of fossil fuel reserves. Chevron has published a climate risk scenario report and attempted to reduce capital spending; however, investor concerns remain because:

Of Chevron's December 2019 announcement of a USD10 billion+ write-down on the value of its assets.
Climate-related tort claims and similar litigation against Chevron are mounting.
Chevron's climate risk reports have downplayed significant factors, such as potential competition from low-carbon energy technologies.
Chevron has supported lobbying and trade associations that spread dis-information on climate science and policy, such as the American Legislative Exchange Council ("ALEC") and the American Petroleum Institute (" API" ).


In addition, inadequate board attention could intensify ongoing risks and controversies related to global operations - such as renewed attacks on Chevron's Nigeria assets in 2016, controversy over operations in Myanmar (given United Notions reports of genocide and crimes against humanity committed by the Burmese army against the Rohingya and other ethnic minorities in Burma), and a landmark enforcement action against Chevron for alleged tax evasion in Australia.

An independent Chair would improve oversight of management, and the attention paid to long-range risks such as those noted above.



THEREFORE: Please vote FOR this common-sense governance enhancement.

How other organisations have declared their voting intentions

Organisation nameDeclared voting intentionsRationale
CoreCommodity Management, LLCFor
Dana Investment Advisors (Delisted)For
Boston Trust WaldenFor
Universities Superannuation Scheme - USSForUSS strongly supports the appointment of an independent Chairman.

DISCLAIMER: By including a shareholder resolution or management proposal in this database, neither the PRI nor the sponsor of the resolution or proposal is seeking authority to act as proxy for any shareholder; shareholders should vote their proxies in accordance with their own policies and requirements.

Any voting recommendations set forth in the descriptions of the resolutions and management proposals included in this database are made by the sponsors of those resolutions and proposals, and do not represent the views of the PRI.

Information on the shareholder resolutions, management proposals and votes in this database have been obtained from sources that are believed to be reliable, but the PRI does not represent that it is accurate, complete, or up-to-date, including information relating to resolutions and management proposals, other signatories’ vote pre-declarations (including voting rationales), or the current status of a resolution or proposal. You should consult companies’ proxy statements for complete information on all matters to be voted on at a meeting.